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abstract There is a tendency among social scientists and others to interpret the recent war and the related 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of a political policy carefully orchestrated from above and systematically carried out. Whatever eruptions of (war)violence might deviate from this interpretation are generally viewed as primitive Balkanism, pointless acts, banditism or mental aberrations. Adopting a long-term historical perspective, this article describes a violence process whose final result can be seen as the ethnic homogenization of a local community, but its dynamics cannot directly be attributed to a policy implemented from above. Rather its course can largely be traced back to clan vendettas and local faction fighting in the context of an emerging pilgrimage regime. The case illustrates that a systematic study 'from below' is crucial to a better understanding of the dynamics and the developmental logic of the processes of 'ethnic cleansing' in this part of ex-Yugoslavia.
keywords Bosnia-Herzegovina, war, violence, ethnic cleansing O n the early morning of 2 7 May 1 992 , Ljerka ivri saw something horrible in the neighbouring yard of her father's brother Djure. Three human bodies, their feet tied to a pipe and the hands behind their backs, were suspended upside down, immersed up to the shoulders in the partially demolished cistern. Djure and his two adult sons Ante and Djure had been savagely slain. Tw o weeks earlier, on the night of 1 0 May , a similar drama had unfolded in Siro Ostoji 's y ard. Someone found Siro's elderly parents there, hanging from the mulberry tree in front of their house, their throats slit and their hands chopped off.
These are only tw o of the long list of atrocities that have dominated life in Medjugorje ever since the autumn of 1 991 . Since 1 981 , Medjugorje, situated mart bax in the southwestern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been a Marian pilgrimage centre with an international reputation. But before they knew it, the villagers found themselves caught up in a vicious process of violence. At first it was only their property they were in danger of losing, but soon it was their lives as well. In early July 1 992, when the Croatian army imposed peace upon the western part of Herzegovina, local violence came to an end. But Medjugorje's mali rat (little war), as the villagers called it, had taken its toll. 1 Of the approximately 3 ,000 villagers, an estimated 1 40 had been killed, 60 were missing and approximately 600 had fled, and a number of buildings had been totally or partially destroyed. 2 These were the sad effects of a violence process which had ravaged Medjugorje like a tornado and had resulted in an ethnic homogenization of the popular pilgrimage centre.
There is a tendency among social scientists, historians, politicians, journalists, and other Balkan specialists to interpret the ethnic cleansing in BosniaHerzegovina as the result of a political policy carefully orchestrated from above and sy stematically carried out. Whatever eruptions of w ar violence might deviate from this interpretation are generally viewed as primitive Balkanism, pointless and absurd violence, the acts of bandits, organized crime, or mental aberrations (e.g. Bali West 1 996) . Terms of this kind reflect an uncritical acceptance of a central or national leader perspective, dismissing as deviant everything that does not go according to plan and denying or downplay ing the significance of specific local and regional circumstances.
In the following pages, a violence process will be described whose final result can be seen as the ethnic homogenization of the Medjugorje community, but its dynamics cannot directly be attributed to a policy implemented from above. Rather, its course can largely be traced back to clan vendettas and local faction fighting in the context of an emerging pilgrimage regime. The case illustrates that a sy stematic study 'from below' is crucial to a better understanding of the dynamics and the developmental logic of processes of ethnic cleansing in this part of ex-Yugoslavia. Only then is it possible to comprehend the so-called absurdities and incongruities and transcend the dichotomy prevalent in the public debate on 'the cause of the war', i.e. a spontaneous manifestation of primitive Balkanism versus mass destruction carefully prepared and planned and carried out from above.
Historical Background: Endemic Enmity and Antagonism
'Here the knife does not go blunt and the (rifle) barrel does not rust', or so an old man concluded his historical view of the region. The recent atrocities of Medjugorje's little w ar did not surprise him, for they were part of a long history of warfare and revenge.
To a certain extent, the long history that the old man was referring to has to do with geo-political circumstances. Until the early decades of the 2 0th century, large parts of ex-Yugoslavia were virtually without interruption border regions disputed by powerful kingdoms and other political pow er blocs.
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For almost five hundred y ears, far into the nineteenth century , ex-Yugoslavia was a pawn in the power game between the Austrians and Hungarians to the northwest and the Ottomans to the southeast. Then it was torn between the Italians and Germans on the Axis side and the Russians and the Allies on the other. And after World War ii, up until the end of the Cold War, the capitalist West and the communist East drove a deep wedge into Yugoslav society (cf. Alexander 1 97 9; Jelavich 1 990). These powers not only severely impeded the development of a stable state with an effective central control over the means of phy sical violence, they also created the conditions for the growth of nationalism and ethnic antagonism (Bana 1 984; Cole 1 981 ; A. Djilas 1 985 , 1 991 ; Ramet 1 985 ; imi 1 991 ; Malcolm 1 994; Denitch 1 996) .
In the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the central part of ex-Yugoslavia, these developments can be traced w ith the greatest clarity. More than four hundred years of warfare between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire made the region an ethnic hotchpotch. Large groups of Serbs from the southeast fled to the Bosnian country side, settling mainly in the less fertile parts of the region (Krajina). Population pressure and a sense of adventure led Croats, mainly from the bleak Dalmatian Mountains, to move southeastward. Large numbers of people eager to take advantage of any opportunity to 'get ahead' converted to Islam, thus laying the foundation for the third ethnic group, the Muslims (Koljevi 1 980; A. Djilas 1 991 ; Bringa 1 995 ; Donia and Fine 1 997 ).
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During this same period, and in part as a reaction to the frequently harsh Ottoman regime, a tradition of small-scale violent resistance developed in Herzegovina: guerrilla bands of hadju i, usta i and etni i.
5 Clusters of these resistance groups made it difficult to permanently pacify the area, and their rivalry promoted acts of revenge and retaliation within and among the various villages (Jelavich 1 990; Koljevi 1 980; Dedijer 1 97 4; Soldo 1 964; Vego 1 981 ). Ow ing to their strategic position vis-à-vis the population, only Roman Catholic clergy men could temporarily curb the violence (Bax 1 995 ).
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The fall of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires in 1 91 2 and 1 91 8 did not put an end to these forms of small-scale violence or stop people from taking the law into their own hands. On the contrary , ever since the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1 929) was founded in 1 91 8 , they constituted an integral component -overtly or covertly -of the interaction between the most important groups, the Serbs and the Croats (Bana 1 984; Ramet 1 985 ).
A current (though not undisputed) opinion is that Serb and Croat national consciousness goes back to the Middle Ages. At the time, each of the groups was a separate kingdom, parts of which are now disputed territory ( imi 1 991 ). Foreign rule put an end to their political independence, but religious beliefs (the Serbian Orthodox Church for the Serbs and Catholicism for the Croats) have alway s remained important identification and distinguishing factors (Ramet 1 984; Rathfelder 1 992 ; Rusinow 1 982 ) .
When the Serbs and Croats united to form one independent kingdom, these old distinctions were transformed into rapidly escalating ethnic differences that soon dominated virtually the entire political arena. Each of the parties was convinced that the other w as after hegemonic control. Certainly at the beginning, the Croats had the most grounds for apprehension. The king of the empire was a Serb, the Serbs were by far the largest group, and they held almost all the important positions in the government, the bureaucracy , the army and the police force and every chance they got, they gave their fellow Serbs preferential treatment (A. Djilas 1 991 ; Soldo n.d.) . This intensified nationalist feelings, and particularly in the ethnically mixed areas, with BosniaHerzegovina at the top of the list, tension ran high. The Serb domination there was characterized by brutal injustice to the Croats, whose political leaders and their local representatives were removed from office and imprisoned. The Croats in turn organized armed gangs called Ustasi, who kidnapped Serb leaders and were not unlikely to murder them as well. Neither of the parties had much patience with traitors (Bana 1 984; Jeli -Buti 1 983 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ; opi 1 963 ; Kri man 1 980, 1 983 ; Star evi 1 941 ). Soon this ethnically mixed area, with borders sometimes running through the middle of villages, turned into a 'complex of snake pits joint together by murder, manslaughter, destruction and betrayal' (Soldo 1 964) .
When the tension spread to other regions and the country became ungovernable, the king disbanded the parliament and instigated a veritable reign of terror. Every trace of opposition was harshly suppressed by gangs of etni i, a loosely organized auxiliary division of the national police, consisting of Serbs who roamed through the Croat areas, robbing and plundering along the way. Their horrendous conduct, which I have described elsewhere (Bax 1 993 ), provoked similar behaviour on the part of the Croats, particularly the Croats of South and West Herzegovina. In this inhospitable region with its coarse and truculent inhabitants, the Usta a groups burgeoned. 7 In tiny guerrilla units, they terrorized the Serb communities (Kri man 1 980; Jeli -Buti 1 986; Tomasevich 1 97 5 ).
The Second World War deepened the chasm of hatred and magnified the violence to almost unprecedented proportions. With the backing of the Axis Powers, the Independent State of Croatia was founded, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of it. With the help of the extremely vicious and pugnacious Usta a organization, the new state made every effort to cleanse Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina of all the Serb elements. The Serbs in these regions sought the help and support of the etni i, who had gone underground en masse after the German demobilization of the Yugoslav army. Bosnia-Herzegovina turned into one huge battlefield, where guerrillas not only attacked each other, but even more so each other's towns and the civilians residing there, enormous numbers of whom they assaulted, mutilated and murdered in the most atrocious ways ( opi 1 963 ; Anonymous 1 986; Jeli 1 97 8 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ; M. Djilas 1 980) .
During this period, the Usta a stronghold Medjugorje lost almost half its population. The village also suffered huge material damage, for almost all the cattle were slaughtered or stolen and many of the homes were destroyed, as were the crops in the fields (Bax 1 991 ) .
A third, perhaps even more cruel party soon joined the w ar, the Partizans led by Tito. With his dreaded and later renowned guerrilla troops, this Communist leader was soon victorious, thanks in part to his incorporation of the etni i, who were being defeated at the time. In 1 943 , aided by the Allies and the Russians, he founded a new Yugoslav state on Bosnian territory (Parin 1 991 ; M. Djilas 1 980, 1 983 ) .
A modern political, executive and legislative system was built up under Tito, putting a formal end to the ethnic violence and personal feuds. Brotherhood and Unity was the motto of the new order focused on total economic and social modernization along socialist lines. For years, an extremely effective system of repression enabled the authorities to present this fiction to the outside world as reality. Although there was a decline in the open hostilities, behind the communist front the old enmity and antagonism lived on undiminished.
Southwestern Herzegovina, the regional focus of this article, may have been cleansed of its numerous Usta i, but their relatives were still treated as mart bax second-class citizens. They were barred from the ruling Communist Party and thus could not obtain state benefits and civil service jobs. In all the public sectors, the Serbs in the region were in control. As ex-Partizans or their offspring, they dominated the Communist Party, the public administration, the police, the army , the bureaucracy and the numerous modern government enterprises (Vego 1 981 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ) . In order to achieve their aims, the Serbs in the region used legal means and methods; the Croats had little choice but to resort to the old forms of self-help. In the formal, legal and political discourse, there w ere no Croats, there w ere only 'criminals', 'subversive elements' and 'reactionary forces' . In the hidden discourse of the dominated Croats, however, the opponents were referred to as Srbi or etni i. Thus formal rules covertly contributed toward the sy stematic exclusion of the Croat opponent -an ethnic cleansing of a sort (M. Djilas 1 97 7 , 1 983 ).
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The veneer of the 'new order' gradually began to wear thin. Driven by circumstances, in the early seventies groups of armed young men who called themselves Usta i began to gather in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their targets were government institutions, the region's numerous arms depots, party officials, and villages dominated by Serbs (Hofw iler 1 992 ; Gelhard 1 992; Soldo n.d.).
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In Medjugorje as w ell, an Usta a cell assembled which, according to my informants, was incorporated in the late seventies into a regional network consisting of several thousand men. In essence this 'organized crime that has spread from the capitalist West', as the regional authorities referred to it, w as a reaction to the fact that the Croats had no rights. The response was not long in coming. Particularly in the smaller towns and villages, where the presence of the official authorities was not so keenly felt, vigilantes gathered, whom their opponents referred to as etni i. Groups of Usta i seemed to be play ing a cat and mouse game with these etni i, w ho w ere sometimes assisted by the official authorities (Soldo n.d.) .
Once again thunderclouds of violence began to gather in the region, but this time there was a countervailing trend of a totally different kind. Its locus was Medjugorje, a humble peasant village in a part of Herzegovina so arid and bleak that only snakes, stones and Usta i could thrive there, or so the say ing goes.
10 In 1 981 , that tiny village became the centre of a Marian devotional movement focused on peace which rapidly assumed international proportions (Bax 1 989, 1 990, 1 995 ).
The pacifying influence this pilgrimage centre exerted for almost a decade can be briefly summarized as follows.
11 The mass influx of more than seventeen million pilgrims from all over the world imposed peace-oriented standards of conduct upon the people of the village and the entire vicinity. During this period there w as a spectacular decline throughout the region in the number of registered crimes, feuds and other forms of violent self-help (see Bax 1 991 ) . The inhabitants of Medjugorje, the entire region, and indeed the regional authorities benefited from the economic boom resulting from the religious tourism.
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The Fall of a Pilgrimage Regime Almost all the villagers renovated their homes to be better able to accommodate more pilgrims, enlarging their capital and taking out new loans all the while. Times were good for all of them, although of course they were better for some than for others.
The Osto ji i fared by far the best, everyone agreed about that. It had once been a poor clan w ith very little land, most of which w as barren because of its location at the foot of the Mountain of the Cross. This was why so many of the Ostoji i had regularly lived and worked abroad, mainly in Germany , the United States and Canada. According to the local population, this had made them a bit stran (different, strange).
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The more signs Medjugorje showed of turning into a flourishing pilgrimage centre, the more Ostoji people returned to their native village. With the capital they earned, they soon rose to occupy a dominant position in the religious tourist industry. They built the only two 'real' hotels in the village, and in a neighbouring hamlet a large bungalow complex for pilgrims, complete with a small chapel. Most of the taxi licences were registered in their name, and at the foot of the Mountain of the Cross, the holiest shrine of all and frequented by virtually all the pilgrims, they set up a number of restaurants, outdoor cafés and souvenir shops. They had a monopoly over almost all the bread and alcohol supplied to the village, and ran the most important local branches of national travel agencies. Their influence was not limited to the immediate vicinity. At the most important arrival sites, the airports at Mostar, Split, Dubrovnik and Zagreb, Ostoji i agents picked up the pilgrims in Ostoji i coaches and brought them to accommodations owned by the Ostoji i clan. All these facilities w ould not have been feasible w ithout an extensive network of connections in the bureaucracies of the district and national government.
Of course this super-entrepreneuring gave rise to jealousy. In particular the Jerkovi i and ivri i, the oldest and most respected clans, felt humiliated by those 'stone eaters', as they called the Ostoji i, whose land was indeed mart bax strewn with stones. They themselves had the best land, and there they grew grapes and tobacco. From Vienna to Istanbul, their produce had been renowned for centuries. They looked down on the Ostoji i because they were so dependent on biro cetni i, as they called the Serb government officials. A good Croat -and the population of Medjugorje, including the nearby hamlets, consisted of Croats -was independent and took care of business without needing any help. That was the rule they lived by , though they did on occasion have to pay a bribe or two themselves (cf. Bax 1 993 ).
As long as every one was able to profit from the expanding pilgrimage economy , the outbursts of jealousy remained small. But when the impending violence of war gradually cut off this lifeline, matters clearly changed. This started in the latter part of the summer of 1 990. Due to terrorist activities of Serbs and Montenegrins, the southern Croatian coastal regions were unsafe and difficult to reach, which meant a sharp fall in the number of pilgrims. Croatia's declaration of independence in December that y ear only served to intensify this trend. And by the early spring of 1 991 , when Croatia and the federal troops were engaged in open warfare, most of the boarding houses in Medjugorje had barely had a pay ing guest for some time. Thanks to bribes and good connections, only the ones owned by the Ostoji i were still partly occupied. Virtually all the villagers had gone deeply into debt, and w hen they were hit by hard times, they could no longer tolerate the 'inequality ' of this situation. Leaders of other clans began to negotiate with the Ostoji i about dividing 'what little there w as' . The negotiations, it is said, did not proceed smoothly. On the contrary , a lot of old resentment surfaced, and in the end the Ostoji i refused to share their favourable entrepreneuring position with any one. The story goes that the parties did not part in friendship, and in fact Medjugorje's 'little w ar' was already looming.
On 1 5 August 1 991 , the Feast of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin, two groups faced each other at the access road to the Mountain of the Cross. A few dozen armed and masked men kept a good three hundred pilgrims, guests of the Ostoji i, from carrying out their plan to climb the Mountain of the Cross in prayer. The pilgrims -this author was among them -were ordered to leave, which they did after several warning shots were fired in the air. Later that day , accompanied by several Ostoji i and a local clergy man, they made a second effort. Again it was in vain. Following the advice of the priest, the pilgrims abandoned their efforts. But this was not the end of it for the Ostoji i. They felt they had been humiliated and their rights had been violated, for the mountain was free territory open to everyone. Behind the masks, they had recognized the faces of a number of villagers, whom they then reported to the police at the district capital of itluk. At a police raid a few day s later, several men were taken from their beds, all of them members of the Jerkovi clan.
The Jerkovi i were quick to express their great indignation and their contempt. In Croat communities in this part of Herzegovina, it w as considered cow ardly to solve a conflict by summoning the police. Up to the war, the police department was an alien pow er apparatus, and what is more it was staffed by Serbs, the sw orn enemies of the Croats (Soldo n.d.) . By calling in the police, the Ostoji i had proved to be friends of the enemy, 'little Serbs' as one informant put it.
A few day s later, two policemen were attacked and beaten in their homes in itluk.
14 And in the following week, in one night all thirty-two of the Ostoji i's taxis were wrecked. The itluk police, summoned once again, did not arrive in time to catch the perpetrators; approximately forty men of the Jerkovi and ivri clans had disappeared from the village.
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Gangs and Vigilantes: The Emergence of Violence Formations
By now the war in Croatia had drastically expanded and its repercussions were increasingly felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb communities received arms from Serbia to be able to defend themselves against 'the fascist aggression of the Usta a', as it was called (Glenny 1 992; Silber and Little 1 996; Denitch 1 996). In response, the Croat inhabitants of Bosnia Herzegovina felt threatened and large numbers of them broke into the numerous local munitions and arms depots of the Territorial Defence, which was soon dismantled as a result. In no time, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina had turned into one vast constellation of heavily armed settlements (Rathfelder 1 992). Side by side with these local vigilantes, small mobile-armed units developed of Serbs and Croats, who roamed the countryside independently or in larger groups, causing trouble wherever they went and burglarizing the army's numerous munitions depots. These units, often referred to as rezervisti, consisted of deserters from the Croatian front, men evading mobilization, members of secret paramilitary organizations of either Croats (Usta i ) or Serbs ( etni i ), villagers who lost their jobs in the now defunct tourist industry and were on the lookout for loot, and lastly , as in Medjugorje, people running aw ay from the police (Hofwiler 1 992 ). In addition, the various sections of the former Yugoslav army , now divided along ethnic lines, also belonged to this extremely dynamic and complex configuration of attack and defence units, sometimes collaborating with each other and sometimes fiercely battling. 'Armies' of Serbs, Croats or mart bax
Muslims, who barely differed in any w ay from the rezervisti described above, operated in the various regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each group tried to gain control over its ow n patch of the ethnic quilt.
In Medjugorje, the Ostoji i feared the rapid disintegration of the official authority crumbled. These people, w hose conduct, ideas and conceptions were so deviant in the region, w ere regularly identified w ith the Serb arch enemy , and were in danger of becoming the victims of a 'cleansing' (ra cistiti teren). In this predominantly Croat area, it was not easy to defend oneself against this kind of campaign w ith the help of one's 'ow n' rezervisti; self-defence and the help of the police were what was needed.
In the course of September 1 991 , the ivri i claimed to have observed some changes in the Ostoji i hamlet at the foot of the Mountain of the Cross. Every day a small police patrol from itluk would come by. The police officers would inspect the streets and fields of the hamlet and then withdraw to the dining room of one of the boarding houses. The men of the Ostoji i clan were rarely observed outdoors, and it seemed as if the community solely consisted of women and children. But in the darkness of the homes and late at night on the edge of the Mountain of the Cross, behind bushes and trees, attentive observers regularly noticed men with guns. Judging from their numbers, they were not just Ostoji i men, and further probing revealed that some of them were men no one in the district had ever seen before. It was later concluded from the licence plates on their cars that they were Ostoji i in-laws from a tow n across the Neretva River that was known as a non-Croat town.
On the adjacent home grounds of the ivri i, these developments w ere warily observed with suspicion. It was becoming clearer and clearer that the Ostoji i maintained ties with the etni i and thus belonged to the enemy camp. Tension rose to a peak when one of the Sivrici boy s, said to have been w orking on a chimney, was shot tw ice from the direction of the Ostoji i. It gave him such a scare that he lost his balance, fell off the roof and broke his arm.
The next night explosions were heard from the direction of the churchy ard, and on the following morning the itluk police found all the Ostoji i graves blown up. The meaning of this act was immediately apparent to everyone: a denial of the rights of the Ostoji i in the community and the destruction of their historical roots. In the past y ear, this age-old custom had been regularly revived on a large scale by Serbs and Croats in the neighbouring extremely militant Krajina region, and it w as alway s the start of a 'cleansing' (Reissmüller 1 992; Rathfelder 1 992). After this act of open aggression, things quieted down. But it was a menacing kind of silence, and the Jerkovi i and ivri i were waiting with bated breath to see how their opponent would respond.
Cleansing and Resistance
Together with men w ho had left and were now returning, equipped w ith ample arms, munitions and explosives from the depot in apljina, the ivri i and Jerkovi i prepared to 'settle matters once and for all' with the enemy. They made good use of know-how acquired in the army and the Territorial Defence. In apljina, some of them had joined the notorious Croatian hos militia. 16 Stepan Jerkovic, a former army officer from Split, became their leader and the troops were called Stepanov i (Stepan's men). Stepan, usually called Stjipe, was backed by six sub group leaders ( asni i ), who each had a number of men (vojni i ) under their command.
The first thing they did was barricade the access road at the mountain pass to the plateau w here Medjugorje is situated. Day and night, they would hide there and guard the road. This made it impossible for their enemy to receive sizeable reinforcements. Limited help could only arrive via the mountain paths, but there too regular patrols were on duty.
It was not only outwardly that Medjugorje began to resemble a stronghold, but inw ardly as well. All the windows in the homes of both the clans were blacked out, and wherever possible the lanes w ere hidden from sight by lines hung with tobacco leaves, branches or straw mats. Virtually undetected by the enemy , it was thus possible to reach each other's property and gather in groups inside the walled courty ards.
The Ostoji i w ere taken completely unawares by the sw ift transformation into what resembled a fortress. And when they too wanted to make a safe place for themselves, they found themselves in the line of fire, though none of the shots hit the mark. Some of the w omen and children fled to the Mountain of the Cross, where they were guarded by clansmen hidden from sight. It was only at night, protected by darkness, that they sometimes ventured to return home for their clothes and something to eat or drink. But the enemy was on guard, and responded to their every move with gunfire.
In November 1 991 , the Stepanov i launched their offensive. Their aim w as to destroy the cisterns at the homes of the Ostojici. In only a few nights, they managed to blow up or render useless 3 0 of the almost 1 7 0 cisterns. Thirty families and their livestock had to fetch water elsewhere. From their hiding places, almost every day the Stepanov i managed to shoot a few head of cattle on the paths.
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Fear was mushrooming in the Ostoji i camp, for it was evident that the superior opponent was engaged in a 'cleansing' . One night early in December, there was a skirmish between several of the guards and a member of the Osto ji clan. After a fracas, the men managed to break aw ay. It was clear to the Stepanov i that their opponents had gone to fetch reinforcements; therefore they intensified their guarding patrols.
To this very day, Stepan's men still do not know how their opponent managed to bring in forty men (the size of two paramilitary units) without their noticing anything. They were soon confronted with these reinforcements -relatives of the Osto ji i from a village to the south that had been 'cleansed' by Serb militiamen. It was a ferocious confrontation. Firing their rifles as a diversionary measure, the Ostoji i succeeded in destroy ing twelve of the ivri i's cisterns. This made a large segment of the ivri clan vulnerable and dependent upon others.
By Christmas 1 991 , Medjugorje's 'little war' took a virtually inevitable turn. On the name-day of his deceased wife, Mate Jerkovi , one of the Jerkovi clan elders, went to her grave to honour her with dried flowers and wild fruit.
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Mate had trouble w alking, w hich was w hy he went by mule. As he was passing the ravaged graves of the Ostoji i, a bullet hit him in the thigh. The bullet was aimed at the mule and not at a person, or so the Ostoji i later informed me when I spoke to them in their hiding place. But the flow of human blood had aw akened the spirit of revenge.
Mutual Destruction
Blood revenge as a form of self-help is an old and still fairly widespread institution in this corner of ex-Yugoslavia (Bax 1 995 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ; Vego 1 981 ). In addition to the state, it w as mainly the clergy who -by way of reconciliation rituals -made every effort to attenuate this way of eliminating one's opponents. In the course of 1 991 , however, state power crumbled and the clergymen of Medjugorje were 'summoned back' to their monasteries in Humac and Siroki Brijeg. This left the parties to their own devices, abandoned to the dynamics of the devastating process they formed w ith each other. Once it had been set in motion, the process exhibited a tendency tow ard escalation, driven as it was by the principle of retribution.
Shortly after the start of the new y ear, this was demonstrated for all to see. The eldest son of Mate, the old man who had been shot on his mule, had shot one of the Ostoji i clan elders in the thigh as a payback for his father's wound. But Mate fell ill and died of his wound. When this happened, his ow n clan's elders all agreed the retribution had to be taken one step further; Jure Ostoji , a brother of the clan elder shot in the thigh, was now shot in the lower back and paralysed for life. His clan refused to accept this and took double revenge: two y oung ivri men were shot in the back, and died on the day of the Feast of the Epiphany (6 January ). Obviously this bloodshed put the parties on guard, for since then neither of the clans, at any rate their male members, dared to show their faces much on the streets in the day time.
Together with a good two hundred other men, most of whom w ere from the Jerkovi and ivri clans, the Stepanov i kept the area closed off. This put the Osto ji i and their relatives from outside the area, more than a hundred men in all, in a perilous position. Their ammunition and food were running out, but if they made a mass break for it, it w ould probably mean a massacre of their own people. Waiting longer, however, would only force them to surrender in the end and leave Medjugorje forever.
For a couple of weeks, nothing special happened; the tension rose and everyone seemed to be waiting for an explosion of violence. It came from an unexpected quarter. Late one afternoon at the end of January 1 991 , a few military aeroplanes from the base in Mostar flew low over Medjugorje. It later turned out that they were looking for a group of Montenegrin soldiers w ho had deserted in East Slavonia and were now headed home, plundering as they went (Mostarski list, 25 January 1 992). Above Medjugorje, the planes (w ith Serb pilots) began to shoot at the church steeples. They missed, but they did hit a few of the homes of the ivri i. The incident distracted attention from the dominant clans, and the Ostoji i were quick to take advantage. Together with some women and children, a group of men managed to reach the pass. Once they got there, however, they met up with the guards. Fierce fighting ensued, and the unprotected Ostoji i were clearly at a disadvantage. Quite a few men, women and children w ere killed, others managed to escape. Some guards also perished in the fighting.
Things were quiet again in Medjugorje, so quiet that a group of unsuspecting pilgrims could move about freely for several day s in the Marian Peace Centre.
18 At regular intervals they saw groups of people, mainly women and children, leave the village with their luggage. When asked about it, they said they were fleeing 'the war'. The pilgrims did not witness the movement in the other direction, the armed men entering the village in the dead of night and spreading out over the houses. They were the relatives of the battling clans who had come to the village from 'liberated' areas, men who were no longer needed at home because their villages had been cleansed, and who had sw orn to avenge all their dead kin.
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Denouement
The exodus continued until the end of March. Growing numbers of women and children left, and Medjugorje increasingly became a stronghold of armed men. 20 A small incident sparked off enormous repercussions. At a courtyard of the Ostoji i, a few intoxicated men were show ing off their skills as marksmen by shooting tins and bottles off a wall w ith their little Scorpio rifles. One of them recklessly tried it with a grenade gun. The grenade exploded and blew a big hole in the wall of Ante ivri 's stable a bit further down the street. The shot was immediately answered in kind, and mortar shells soon set two homes ablaze, killing the elderly tenants.
Hardly a day w ent by w ithout each of the sides doing some damage to the other's property , especially their livestock, supply sheds and cisterns. But it was the sharply rising number of avengers inside the gates of Medjugorje that gave 'the war' another turn: personal retribution in the dead of night or at dawn with a knife and a rope. An estimated eighty people, almost sixty of whom were locals, lost their lives this way ; their mutilated bodies, usually hanging from a tree or ceiling beam, bore witness to the atrocious acts.
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The complicated process of retribution went on until the end of May, when the denouement came just as suddenly as the start. It was linked to military developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina at large. Flanked by irregular militia, a unit of the Croatian army was on its way from apljina to Listica. There a Serb military unit that wanted to force a passageway through to the west was being obstructed by armed groups of Usta i from the region. The Croatian troops stopped near Medjugorje for the night. When patrols found out about what w as going on there, an hos unit from apljina decided to go off and rescue their 'Croat friends' . It w as a short surprise attack that resulted, as informants later related, in a complete 'cleansing' of the Ostoji i hamlet. Well nigh a hundred people, mostly men, were captured and taken off to a ravine in the vicinity , or so the story goes, w here they were shot and killed.
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At the end of June 1 992, I was able to see for myself that Medjugorje was once again accessible for pilgrims. From the coast up to approximately thirty kilometres past the pilgrimage centre, the area had been 'purged' of the 'Serb aggressor'. The area had 'the protection of the Croatian army and its allies', as pamphlets at the improvised Customs Office announced. The hustle and bustle had returned to the devotion centre. Several hundred pilgrims from Italy , Canada and the United States were being catered to by villagers, who apologized for the inconvenience and the disarray 'the war' had caused. The pilgrims were very understanding, and they were glad that 'these people could live in freedom again' and that 'the Message of Peace had triumphed' . Once again houses were being built and repaired throughout the vicinity, but it did not seem out of the ordinary, since construction work had been a familiar sight for y ears. Singing resounded from the Mountain of the Cross: groups of pilgrims w ere praying the stations. Work was also being done on the private homes in the Ostoji i hamlet -now occupied by Jerkovi i and ivri i and their relatives who had come to join them. At the cemetery of Medjugorje, concealed behind bushes and trees, part of the ground was left fallow. Only a y ear earlier, this had been consecrated earth, the last resting place of a clan that was part of this district. Now not a single trace of their existence was left. But somewhere out there, the people of Medjugorje knew, a hatred smouldered that would one day be sparked into flame again.
Conclusion
In the previous pages a process has been described, the final result of which can be seen as the ethnic homogenization of a local community. This process w as not the result of a political-military policy implemented from above. On the other hand, it makes little sense to maintain, as might be done in social science circles, that it was the outcome of primitive Balkanism, pointless and absurd violence, or mental aberrations. On the contrary; its course could be traced back to clan vendettas and local faction fighting in the context of an emerging pilgrimage regime and under the circumstances of a crumbling state monopoly on organized violence.
The Medjugorje case illustrates that the sy stematic study from below is crucial to a better understanding of the dynamics and developmental logic of processes of 'ethnic cleansing' in this part of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it must be kept in mind that, rather than being political oppositions, in the social sciences 'from above' and 'from below' are interrelated and consequently supplementary perspectives on how people live together.
The case study of Medjugorje may also open options for a more detailed understanding of the recent war in this part of ex-Yugoslavia. It may indicate that the bloodshed did not come out of the the blue, nor was it the direct result of spectres that went back half a century or so and had my steriously come to life again. It may indicate that it constituted a temporary intensification and expansion of what is essentially an ongoing process of maintaining and reproducing extremely passionate antagonism between and sometimes even w ithin local groups. It can then also become clear that the term 'w ar' (rat) as it is used in Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be taken to mean the mart bax same thing as in other parts of the world. The generic term rat not only pertains to violent processes between regular armies at the national level, but also to more private feuds between families and clans as well as all the more flexible and temporary violent operations at intermediary levels of social integration.
The case described above also draws our attention to the fact that ethnic identities are not alway s as fixed as our experience in Western Europe suggests. When members of the Ostoji i clan came to Medjugorje in the late 1 7 th century , they were indicated as Serb refugees from a southern area. In the times that followed, they were converted to Roman Catholicism and later registered by the secular authorities as Croats. During the recent war, a Serb identity was forced upon them by the other, rivalling clans of Medjugorje and they w ere treated accordingly by the Croatian army that was passing through the area. In short, Medjugorje's problems were not ethnic in origin. Rather, they were ethnicized in the course of its development.
In his recent study on Kosovo, Ger Duijzings has convincingly argued and illustrated that ambiguous, double, and multiple ethnic identities are quite normal phenomena in this part of the Balkans. Rather than being fixed and static, these socio-cultural categorizations are changeable, flexible and manipulable; they reflect the results of conflicts, contestations and negotiations (Duijzings 1 999; see also Sorabji 1 993 , 1 995 ; Denitch 1 994). Thus, the current notion of firmly established ethnic identities being the root-cause of the recent Balkan problems is a simplification and an inadequate representation of reality , carefully propagated by national political leaders and uncritically adopted by scientists and journalists from abroad. Here again, then, a national or central leader perspective seems to dominate in most of Western analyses of Balkan society.
There is one intriguing question that should be addressed here: Why do Western circles not have a more realistic view of the complexities of the ethnically oriented antagonism in this region of the Balkans? Why do they uncritically accept the central and national leader perspective? A partial explanation can be sought in the effective concealment strategies of the Communist regime under Tito. Every effort to draw public attention to ethno-nationalistic differences was relentlessly suppressed or depicted by the strictly censored Yugoslav state press as 'manipulation by capitalist powers', 'undermining activities on the part of subversive elements' or simply as the work of 'gangsters' . Virtually w ithout a word of criticism, Western European intellectual and political circles accepted this version as the truth. Any critical in-quiry into the recent past of Yugoslavia was punishable by a lengthy prison sentence (Bali 1 992; Kideckel 1 993 ; Ramet 1 984) . In addition to Stalinist communists (Tito's arch-enemies), the infamous political prison at Goli Otok, situated near a formerly popular tourist island in the Adriatic, was almost solely populated by historians, journalists, and authors who had shed some critical light on the former Yugoslavia's recent past (Bali 1 992; Soldo n.d.) .
This Western unawareness was not alleviated by any anthropological or ethnographic studies at the local level. On the contrary; in their impressive review article they w rote in 1 983 , Halpern and Kideckel did not mention a single publication about local-level political relations and processes, for the simple reason that there were none. The study of ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia was taboo in anthropological circles, and that of ethnicity long remained confined to ludistic and folkloristic descriptions and analy ses of the cultural content of ethnic identity (e.g. The famous historian and sociologist Norbert Elias repeatedly noted that social developments are characterized by a combination of regularity and randonmness, explainability and pure chance. On lower levels of integration, occurrences that might be regular and explainable on a high level become erratic, unpredictable, and dependent on random circumstances and personal quirks. Ever since the Middle Ages, the processes of state formation and state development in Western Europe have exhibited regularity and structure, development in a certain direction, and can be analy zed and interpreted as such (Elias 1 982 ; see also Wilterdink 1 993 ) . It is from this perspective, characteristic of Western Europe, that the developments in former Yugoslavia in general and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular are generally examined and evaluated. The case of Medjugorje shows that what might seem random and unpredictable on a higher societal level demonstrates a large extent of regularity and explainability at a local level. The conclusion seems obvious that for a better understanding of the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina -and possi-mart bax bly for the present problems of violence in Europe in general -attention should be more sy stematically devoted to processes and developments at lower levels of social integration.
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Mali rat is the term used in the region for small, often local violent operations of the kind traditionally endemic to the area: complicated blood revenge, whereby sometimes whole families are killed or driven aw ay, and surprise attacks or pillaging raids on neighbouring villages by roaming gangs of armed men or other relatively small and informal violent groups. According to my informants, mali rat can be a side effect of organized warfare on a larger scale, but it is not equivalent to it. The Second World War and the recent hostilities in Croatia between sections of the former federal army gave rise to numerous eruptions of local violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the 'large' war broke out between the 'real' armies at Sarajevo and other cities in April 1 992, it re-activated these local feuds. The smallscale local wars have become closely interwoven with the far larger ones, and they are part and parcel of eac h other's dynamics and raison d'être. Mali rat is related to a stage of state formation that is characteristic of this part of ex-Yugoslavia, where the monopoly over the means of organized violence is still ineffectively founded upon a central plan (cf. also Denitch 1 996; Donia and Fine 1 997 ). 2. I cannot provide any thing other than rough estimations. The registration records in itluk were destroy ed, which is generally viewed as part of a war strategy focused upon destroy ing the territorial claims of certain segments of the population. The parish of Medjugorje has its own records, but they are said to have been destroyed as well. 3 . As to the relation between the shifting spheres of influence on the peripheries of polities and the occurrence of self-help and local formations of violence, see Boehm 1 985 . Cf. also Seers et al. 1 97 9. 4. The Muslims do not play a role in the story to be told here. 5 . Aleksa Djilas (1 991 ) noted that these terms refer to small paramilitary groups that were first observed in the early days of Turkish rule.
6. During the recent war, the Roman Catholic clergy from the area, the Franciscan friars in particular, play ed a vital role in the organization and mobilization of violence formations among the rural population of western Herzegovina (cf. also Sells 1 996) . Later, they were also crucial in the repacification process of the region. Apparently then, the 'separation between Church and State', characteristic of most European countries of today , is still virtually absent in this part of exYugoslavia (see Bax, forthcoming). 7 . 'Mars must be more hospitable than western Herzegovina and it is hard to imagine any body wanting to conquer it ...' (Glenny (Territorial Defence) was set up, which not only served to support the regular army , but could also operate completely independently. For this purpose, in almost all the towns and villages arms and munitions depots were built, which were under the supervision of local militia and where all the adults, women as well as men, played a role. Each local community could thus function as a relatively autonomous paramilitary unit. Although designed to create a unified Yugoslav military powerhouse, the system contained the seeds for a highly complex internal 'total war' like the one that engulfed Bosnia and in part Croatia as well. More information about the Territorial Defence and its problematic relation to the regular federal army can be found in Mladenovic 1 97 0; Ramet 1 985 ; Hofwiler 1 992; Wiener 1 986; Remington 1 97 9; Ross Johnson 1 97 3 ; and Rusinow 1 97 1 . 1 0. Snakes feature in many of the say ings and proverbs of the region, symbolizing unreliability and unpredictability. Relations in Herzegovina were often described to me by way of the say ing Ne vjeruj zmiji ni kad bi imala sobje strane rep (Never trust a snake, not even if it has tw o tails). 1 1 . I described these changes at great length from various angles in other publications (cf. Bax 1 989, 1 990, 1 991 , 1 993 , 1 995 ). 1 2 . In 1 990 Zagreb Turist reported that 1 9 per cent of the total turnover in the country 's tourist secto r was from the devotion centre in Medjugorje.
1 3 . Elsewhere I describe in detail the historical background of this clan and its ambiguous ethnic and socio-religious past. They came to Medjugorje as Serb refugees from a southern region in the second part of the 1 7 th century. In the first decades of the 1 9th century , they were converted to Roman Catholicism, but they went on practising some ancient Serbian Orthodox rituals. And after World War ii, they declared themselves in the censuses as belonging to the Croat narod (nation) (Bax 1 995 ; see also Vego 1 981 ; Quaestio 1 97 9). 1 4. Mostarski list, 2 8 August, 1 992. 1 5 . At this moment, I was advised also to leave the village, which I did. As a result, I could not systematically observe 'in the field' how the 'little war' related to the dynamics of everyday life in Medjugorje -a subject which deserves systematic attention, as has been demonstrated in a fascinating way by Price (1 992) and Povrzanovi (1 992) . What follows is primarily based on long and frequent discussions with members of the three refugee groups in Germany , and on later observations and interviews on the spot. 1 6. The hos (Hrvatske Obrambene Snage) is a paramilitary wing of the extremely militant and violence-oriented nationalist Party of the Right (Hrvatska Stranka Prava) formerly led by S. Paraga. As regards its aims and methods, this party is similar to the former Usta a movement in the day s of World War ii. In the past, the men of the ivri and Jerkovi clans had been members of a gang that covered the entire Brotnjo area and regularly attacked the (Serbian) government. 1 7 . More information on this custom can be found in Bax 1 991 . 1 8 . Inquiries among the refugees from Medjugorje in Germany revealed that the parties were not in agreement. One party claimed the relative tranquility was promoted by the arrival of a group of pilgrims. The other party maintained that a group of pilgrims took advantage of the relative tranquility in Medjugorje at the time.
Further investigation made it clear that up to the end of February, a group of fanatic pilgrims from Canada led by tw o of their own priests was in Medjugorje for more than ten days. When I questioned him over the telephone, a priest informed me that they had not noticed any traces of warfare in Medjugorje. They found it quite understandable that there were no priests in the village, and that uniformed men had blocked their way to the Mountain of the Cross 'because of hostilities'. This information reveals something of the difference in perception between the villagers and the pilgrims. 1 9. They were mainly men from Croat villages that had been 'purged' of Serbs.
There were also a few relatives from East Slavonia, the children or grandchildren of former Usta a members who emigrated from the region. The vengeful mentality of these emigrants in their battle against Serbs in East Slavonia -who also come from Herzegovina -has been disconcertingly described by Glenny (1 992 ). (See also Denitch 1 996.) 2 0. It was mainly during this period that the exodus to Germany took place. 21 . The mutilations followed a fixed pattern, with more and more parts of the bodies being removed. The symbolic dynamics would undoubtedly be an informative field for further research. 2 2. It is said to be the same ravine as where a similarly horrendous mass grave was effectuated toward the end of World War ii. It is one of many historical sites where hatred lives on for the suffering that has been inflicted (cf. Bax 1 993 , 1 995 , 1 997 ) .
